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THE MANLY SPORTS: THE PROBLEMATIC
USE OF CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE
SPORTS VIOLENCE
With increasing frequency, the criminal law has been used to punish
athletes who act with excessive violence while playing inherently violent
sports. This development is problematic as none of the theories that courts
employ to justify this intervention adequately take into account the
expectations of participants and the interests of the ruling bodies of sports.
This Essay proposes a standard for the interaction of violent sports and
criminal law that attempts to reconcile the rules of violent sports with the
aims of the criminal law.
JEFFREY STANDEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
When not on the playing field, an athlete stands in the same relation to
the criminal law as does any other citizen.1 The particular requirements of
the athlete's sport, where that sport includes acts of a violent nature, do not
supply the athlete a special defense of "diminished capacity. '2  Thus, an
athlete has never successfully claimed that his particular conditioned-
behavior characteristics of learned violence allow him, like a "battered
spouse," wider latitude in justifying criminal conduct. 3 The fact that no
athlete has successfully articulated such a defense to off-field behavior is
surprising, given the volume of sociological literature that supports the
Professor of Law, Willamette University. My thanks to Jeff Koenig for his research
assistance. This Essay is substantially borrowed from my forthcoming book, JEFFREY
STANDEN, SPORTS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 2010). All rights are held by
Oxford University Press.
1 See generally Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic
Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048 (1996) (noting that sports leagues may not wish to usurp
government authority by enacting league-wide domestic violence sanctions).
2 Nonetheless, some have argued that athletes have a greater propensity for certain
crimes of violence, such as domestic abuse. See id. at 1050.
3 See 34 Am. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § I (1983); Victoria Mikesell Mather, The Skeleton
in the Closet: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39
MERCER L. REv. 545 (1988).
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claim that an athlete's conditioned behavior tends to produce violent
conduct off of the playing field.4
Acts of violence that take place on the playing field are treated in an
entirely different manner.5 Assaults and batteries that would render an
athlete subject to criminal prosecution were they to occur away from the
playing field are considered "part of the game" when they happen during
the course of a violent sport.6 Typically, where such assaulting acts exceed
certain perceived standards of appropriate play on the field, the worst result
an athlete may expect is a league sanction in the form of a fine or brief
suspension.7 Only in unusual, but not entirely rare, cases does the act of
violence on the playing field subject the participant to a risk of criminal
prosecution. These cases typically involve a rather egregious act of violent
assault that gains public notoriety and that so far transgresses the stated and
unstated norms of the game to render the public prosecution relatively
unproblematic.8
The reason athletic participants may visit assaults and batteries upon
each other revolves around the idea of "consent" that permeates the relevant
decisions. 9 In the context of sports, consent is a term that eludes easy
definition. It refers to the issue of whether or not consent to a particular
4 See, e.g., ELAINE CASSEL & DOUGLAS A. BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 120-22 (2d
ed., L. Erlbaum Associates 2007) (2000); Walter Kuhlman, Comment, Violence in
Professional Sports, 1975 WiS. L. REV. 771, 779.
5 See Christo Lassiter, Lex Sportiva: Thoughts Towards a Criminal Law of Competitive
Contact Sport, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 35, 60-68 (2007) (reviewing domestic
statutes and English and American legal rules).
6 See, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393 (Cal. 2006) (stating that
pitches thrown at a batter's head are part of the game of baseball).
7 See, e.g., Tom Weir, Haynesworth Suspended Five Games: Kicking Cowboy in Head
Brings Longest Penalty for On-Field Action, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at IC, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/titans/2006-10-02-haynesworth-
suspension-x.htm (commenting on a player who received a five-game suspension as a
penalty for kicking off the helmet of another player, and subsequently stomping and scraping
the unprotected head of that player); Lassiter, supra note 5, at 44 (explaining the
Haynesworth incident in more detail).
8 See, e.g., R. v. Green, [1971] O.R. 591 (Can.) (slashing opponent's shoulder with
hockey stick); R. v. Maki, [1970] O.R. 780 (Can.) (slashing opponent's face with hockey
stick). During a 1969 exhibition hockey game in Canada, professional hockey player Ted
Green hit Wayne Maki with his hockey stick. Maki retaliated by hitting Green with his
hockey stick, fracturing Green's skull. Canadian authorities brought charges against both
players.
9 See Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 353 (1876) (holding that one party's
license to another to beat him is not valid); People v. Freer, 381 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Dist. Ct.
1976) (holding that athletic participant cannot consent to "overly violent" activity); People v.
Fitzsimmons, 34 N.Y.S. 1102, 1108 (Ct. Sessions 1895) (concluding that ability to consent
hinges on whether activity consented to is a "dangerous activity"); State v. Dunham, 693
N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ohio 1997) (holding that consent to certain sports is ineffective).
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sport, presumably given voluntarily, is nonetheless valid.' °  Stated
differently, even willing, factually consenting participants may not give
valid consent to certain sporting activities, such as a sport that occasions
excessive risk to life and limb." In this sense, the law provides limitations
on consent. This notion of consent can be captured by the term legality.
12
Consent can also, more commonly, refer to the automatic, "presumed
consent" that a participant impliedly gives upon agreeing to play a
particular sport. In these presumed-consent cases, consent is found even if,
in fact, it is not given in an informed, volitional, affirmative manner.
13
Finally, the term consent is used to refer to the factual provision of
affirmative consent in the particular case. A participant in a sports contest,
even an illegal one, may nonetheless defend his assaulting conduct on the
grounds that the plaintiff consented to the assault through a demonstration
of "volitional consent."'
14
Despite the obstacles that consent poses to a criminal prosecution, U.S.
history is dotted with criminal convictions for on-field behavior.
Certainly, prosecutorial discretion has countenanced restraint in bringing
indictments for conduct on the playing field.' 6 Indeed, there are several
strong policy-based arguments against extending criminal liability to
athletic endeavors. 17 Nonetheless, egregious assaults have, with notable
frequency, generated criminal prosecutions. What this approach has led to,
at least in an abstract sense, is the result we have today: that criminal
prosecutors and criminal juries, and not the governing bodies of a sport or
10 See, e.g., Dunham, 693 N.E.2d at 1178-79; Collberg, 119 Mass. at 351-53.
11 See, e.g., Fitzsimmons, 34 N.Y.S. at 1108-09.
12 See Cheryl Hanna, Sex Is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal Law, 42 B.C.
L. REv. 239, 250 (2001) (drawing on social norms in determining the legality of consent to
violent sports contact).
13 See, e.g., State v. Shelley, 929 P.2d 489, 490 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
participants in athletic contests are deemed to have consented to reasonably foreseeable
hazards of joint participation in contests).
14 One other issue, common to the criminal law, becomes paramount in a prosecution for
on-court activity: the matter of criminal intent. Ordinarily, the fact that a private citizen, for
example, took a stick in his hands and approached the victim, striking him in the head,
provides ample evidence of the requisite criminal intent. For a hockey player, however,
whose legal job function requires him to take a stick in his hand and attempt a legal body
check or other defensive screening action against an opponent, it is extraordinarily difficult
to detect the presence of assaultive intent.
15 See Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, The Problem of Sports Violence and the Criminal
Prosecution Solution, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 145, 156-60 (2002); Note, Consent in
Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L. REV. 148 (1976).
16 See RICHARD B. HoRRow, SPORTS VIOLENCE: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE
LAW-MAKING AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 13 (Carrollton Press 1980); Yates & Gillespie, supra
note 15, at 167-68.
17 See infra note 143.
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league, increasingly define the outer contours of permissible sporting
activity.
II. THE LEGALITY OF VIOLENCE
Regardless of the willingness of the participants, the laws of most
states have always placed limits on the legality of certain sporting
ventures. The doctrine of consent as a defense to sports violence is
available only in a contest that constitutes a legal sporting event. 19 Thus,
the court properly rejected application of this doctrine in a prosecution
involving a felonious assault arising out of an illegal street fight.2z
Similarly, bare-knuckle boxing,21 cock fighting,2 dog fighting,23 and
other so-called manly or blood sports have been the subject of long-
standing prohibitions. Courts and legislatures feared for the safety of the
participants. For instance, hours-long battles that at times resulted in severe
injury were not unknown to the sport of bare-knuckle fighting.24
Lawmakers also feared that certain blood sports had unusual potential to
18 For an interesting history of bare-knuckle prize fighting and its recurring issues with
legality, see ELLIOTT J. GORN, THE MANLY ART: BARE-KNUCKLE PRIZE FIGHTING IN
AMERICA (1986).
19 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 352-53 (1876) (contrasting
consent in legal sports, such as wrestling, and those which are illegal, such as prize-fighting).
20 State v. Dunham, 693 N.E.2d. 1175 (Ohio 1997).
21 See GORN, supra note 18.
22 Cock fighting is illegal in every state, with Louisiana being the last to have enacted a
ban in 2007. Thirty-three states have made this crime a felony, and in forty states it is illegal
to spectate at a cockfight. See Ed Anderson, Louisiana's Ban on Cockfighting Takes Effect
Friday, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 12, 2008, at 1.
23 Dog fighting is illegal in all U.S. states, but retains a significant underground
following. See Humane Soc. of the U.S., Dogfighting Fact Sheet,
http://www.hsus.orglhsus-field/animal-fighting-the-final-round/dogfighting-fact-sheet/
(last visited June 3, 2009).
24 GORN, supra note 18, at 75-76. The author recounts, from contemporary newspaper
articles, the famous bare-knuckle contest between fighters Lilly and McCoy:
Round 70th-McCoy was now indeed a most unseemly object: both eyes were black-the left
one nearly closed, and indeed that whole cheek presented a shocking appearance. His very
forehead was black and blue; his lips were swollen to an incredible size, and the blood streamed
profusely down his chest. My heart sickened at the sorry sight. When he came up he appeared
very weak, and almost gasping for breath, and endeavored, while squaring away, to eject the
clotting fluid from his throat.
Id.
Despite the obvious, McCoy's seconds, all with large wagers on their man, refused to
concede the fight, as did McCoy. McCoy was knocked down eighty times in total and
fought 118 times. At the end of the last round, McCoy collapsed and died, having drowned
in his own blood. The fight lasted for two hours and forty-one minutes. This fatality,
reportedly the first in America from the new sport, drew public outrage, even as the public
demanded more fights. Id.
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disrupt the public peace, inciting riotous or assaulting behavior on the part
of spectators.25 Finally, and significantly, courts in particular eviscerated
the common law justification for manly sports by subjecting them to a
utilitarian test: whether or not the sports developed a "socially useful" skill
or trait in the participants,26 much like horse racing, for example, has long
been justified as a means to improve horse breeding and training practices.27
Few blood sports survived this social utilitarian review unchanged.
One case in particular illustrates this novel approach by the courts. A
license (a permission) granted by one boxer to subject himself to the
potential of a beating at the hand of his opponent was held void.28 The
1876 Massachusetts decision in Commonwealth v. Collberg29 is typical of
the period. Two boxers, by mutual agreement, met in a non-public place to
fight before an audience of fifty to one hundred spectators.30 At that time in
history, these boxers probably fought under Broughton's Boxing Rules of
1743,31 under which the boxing match proceeded until submission or a
25 Id. at 77; see also Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350, 353 (1876).
26 See, e.g., Collberg, 119 Mass. at 353.
27 See Katherine Simpson Allen, A Horse Is a Horse (Of Course): Equine Collateral,
Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 17, 17 (noting the value of a racehorse as propagator of
the species).
28 Collberg, 119 Mass, at 353.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 352.
31 Rules were devised by the famous bare-knuckle fighter Jack Broughton, who had
bragged (until a defeat late in his life) that he had a lifetime's unbeaten record. Prior to these
rules, it was not uncommon for fighters to continue until the death of one of the combatants.
Broughton established seven rules, the fourth of which essentially permitted the fighter to
lose by submission or a refusal to continue.
1. That a square of a yard be chalked in the middle of the stage, and on every fresh set-to after
a fall, or being parted from the rails, each Second is to bring his Man to the side of the square,
and place him opposite to the other, and till they are fairly set-to at the Lines, it shall not be
lawful for one to strike at the other.
2. That, in order to prevent any Disputes, the time a Man lies after a fall, if the Second does
not bring his Man to the side of the square, within the space of half a minute, he shall be deemed
a beaten Man.
3. That in every main Battle, no person whatever shall be upon the Stage, except the
Principals and their Seconds, the same rule to be observed in bye-battles, except that in the latter,
Mr. Broughton is allowed to be upon the Stage to keep decorum, and to assist Gentlemen in
getting to their places, provided always he does not interfere in the Battle; and whoever pretends
to infringe these Rules to be turned immediately out of the house. Every body is to quit the
Stage as soon as the Champions are stripped, before the set-to.
4. That no Champion be deemed beaten, unless he fails coming up to the line in the limited
time, or that his own Second declares him beaten. No Second is to be allowed to ask his man's
Adversary any questions, or advise him to give out.
5. That in bye-battles, the winning man to have two-thirds of the Money given, which shall
be publicly divided upon the Stage, notwithstanding any private agreements to the contrary.
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32
refusal to continue. Thus, the fight possessed many attributes of a
modem, legal prize boxing match. The court reported that both participants
were bruised in the contest, which continued until one fighter capitulated.33
The opinion conceded that "certain manly sports calculated to give bodily
strength, skill and activity and 'to fit people for defence.., in time of
need"' were not necessarily unlawful under the common law.34 Examples
of such useful manly sports included those involving cudgels (clubs), foils
(swords), and wrestling. Boxing, however, "serve[d] no useful purpose"
and "tend[ed] to [produce] breaches of the peace., 35  Consequently, the
court concluded that boxing matches were "unlawful even when entered
into by agreement and without anger or mutual ill will. '36 Thus, evidence
of consent was irrelevant, as consent of the parties did not make valid an
unlawful act.37
6. That to prevent Disputes, in every main Battle the Principals shall, on coming on the Stage,
choose from among the gentlemen present two Umpires, who shall absolutely decide all Disputes
that may arise about the Battle; and if the two Umpires cannot agree, the said Umpires to choose
a third, who is to determine it.
7. That no person is to hit his Adversary when he is down, or seize him by the ham, the
breeches, or any part below the waist. A man on his knees to be reckoned down.
As agreed by several Gentlemen at Broughton's Ampitheatre, Tottenham Court Road,
August 16, 1743. M.C. (Mike) Southom, Broughtons Rules, EAST SIDE BOXING, Oct. 19,
2005, http://www.eastsideboxing.com/news.php?p=4966&more 1.
32 The great bare-knuckle fighter John L. Sullivan and U.S. President Theodore
Roosevelt both contributed to the gradual replacement of the rugged Broughton Rules with
the more modem Queensbury rules. GORN, supra note 18, at 205-25. The Queensbury rules
featured timed rounds, gloved hands, and prohibited the clinches and wrestling-like moves
that enabled superior bare-knuckle fighters to deliver dangerous blows. Id. at 179-247.
33 Collberg, 119 Mass at 352.
34 Id. at 353.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Boulter v. Clark, in FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO
TRIALS AT Nisi PRIUS 16 (5th ed., London 1790) (1768) (holding that where fighting was
unlawful, a defense that the plaintiff consented would be no bar to the action); Bell v.
Hansley, 48 N.C. 131 (3 Jones) (1855) ("One may recover in an action for assault and
battery, although he agreed to fight with his adversary; for such agreement to break the peace
[is] void ... "); Stout v. Wren, 8 N.C. 420,420 (1 Hawks) (1821) ("A man shall not recover
a recompense for an injury received by his own consent, provided the act from which the
injury is received be lawful: but where two fight by consent, and one is beaten, he may
recover damages for the injury, because fighting is an unlawful act."); Matthew v. Ollerton,
[1693] 90 Eng. Rep. 438 (K.B.) (holding that a man may not license another to beat him as
that amounts to a breach of the peace); see also Logan v. Austin, 1 Stew. 476, 476 (Ala.
1828) ("Public policy will not authorize one man to beat another, although he consent to it,
as it is against morality, and might lead to a violation of the public peace .... "); Adams v.
Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531 (1870) (holding that consent may mitigate damages); R. v. Lewis,
[1844] 174 Eng. Rep. 874 (Q.B.), 875 ("[N]o one is justified in striking another, except it be
in self-defence; and it ought to be known, that, whenever two persons go out to strike each
[Vol. 99
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The Collberg opinion and others38 that revised the common law
evidenced a decidedly utilitarian perspective on sports. Certain sports were
prohibited by these courts not on account of moral considerations, such as
abhorrence of violent fighting or blood, but rather because the particular
violence or bloodshed served no useful purpose in conditioning men or
preparing them for some other (presumably legal) battle, as in time of war.39
Certain sporting contests, notably prize fights, were viewed skeptically on
an additional utilitarian ground, their tendency to incite viewing fans into
acts of violence or other breaches of the peace. 40 Thus, sporting contests in
this era had to be justified by reference to some purpose or goal other than,
and greater than, the enjoyment of the sport for its own sake. The fact that
the participants had mutually consented to engage in the sport, with its
attendant and obvious risks, was immaterial to the legality of the activity.41
Gradually, this inflexible view softened. In the 1895 manslaughter
prosecution of a prize fighter for the unintentional killing of his opponent,
42
People v. Fitzsimmons, the jury acquitted the defendant despite a state
statute that made prize fighting a criminal misdemeanor.43 The court's
lengthy and discursive jury instructions on the issue of consent stated that
although one could not consent to an illegal act, whether or not a particular
consent is permissible depends on whether or not the victim had consented
to a "dangerous" activity.44 If the activity were not a dangerous one and
thus the participants had, according to the trial judge, consented to a game
in which the rules and practices were reasonable, then the consent itself was
reasonable, and an accidental, non-intentional homicide constituted an
excusable homicide.45  In effect, the judge's instructions turned the
other, and do so, each is guilty of an assault," and it is immaterial who struck the first blow.).
But see Champer v. State, 14 Ohio St. 437, 437 (1863) ("[A]n indictment against A. for an
assault and battery upon B., is not sustained by evidence that A. assaulted and beat B. in a
fight at fisticuffs, by agreement between them."); State v. Beck, 19 S.C.L. 363, 363 (1 Hill)
(S.C. Ct. App. 1833) (holding that a whipping intended to save the victim from prosecution
for theft was not an assault and battery where the whipping was at the victim's "earnest
request").
38 See supra note 37.
39 See Collberg, 119 Mass. at 353.
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 34 N.Y.S. 1102 (Ct. Sessions 1895).
43 The statute in question read: "A person who, within this state, engages in, instigates,
aids, encourages, or does any act to further a contention or fight, without weapons, between
two or more persons, or a fight commonly called a ring or prize fight, either within or
without the state [and then follows in regard to sending a challenge], is guilty of a
misdemeanor." Id. at 1102, 1106-07.
44 Id. at 1108.
41 Id. at 1109.
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legislature's prohibition on its head by permitting the defense of consent as
long as the sporting contest was reasonable and not dangerous.
The traditional illegality of certain blood or manly sports continues in
modem jurisprudence. 46 For sports that are deemed "non-dangerous" or
"reasonable," however, consent remains a viable defense.47 In these later
decisions, only those acts of assault that were "overly violent" lay outside
of the consent defense. Thus, in the 1976 opinion in People v. Freer,48 the
court held that an athletic participant could not legally consent to an "overly
violent" activity. 49 The conviction stemmed from a football game in which
the victim, a defensive player, punched the ball carrier while tackling him. 50
This initial punch, the court ruled, was properly consented to, since using a
punching motion while tackling in the game of football is part of the
game.5 1 After the rough tackle, as the play drew to a close, the ball carrier
punched the tackler back. 2 This second punch gave rise to the criminal
prosecution, where the court denied the defendant the opportunity to present
evidence of consent as a defense.53 Instead, the court ruled, as a matter of
law, that the participants could not consent to an "overly violent" attack of
this kind:
Initially it may be assumed that the very first punch thrown by the complainant in
the course of the tackle was consented to by defendant. The act of tackling an
opponent in the course of a football game may often involve 'contact' that could
easily be interpreted to be a 'punch'. Defendant's response after the pileup to
complainant's initial act of 'aggression' cannot be mistaken. Clearly, defendant
intended to punch complainant. This was not a consented to act.54
Indeed, this decision is factually supportable. The court reasoned that
"any attack which the defendant may have believed was being made upon
him was terminated by the pileup which ensued after the initial contact
between the [victim] and the defendant at the time of the tackle., 55 After
46 See Am. Boxing and Athletic Ass'n v. Chemung County Y.M.C.A., 787 N.Y.S.2d
413, 416 (App. Div. 2004) (explaining public safety interest in regulation of wrestling and
boxing events, noting criminal penalties for noncompliance).
47 See Lassiter, supra note 5, at 65 ("[I]f the rules and practices of the game are
reasonable, consented to by all engaged, and are not likely to induce grievous bodily injury
or death, then injuries... on the field of play are excused.").
48 381 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Dist. Ct. 1976).
49 Id. at 978 ("There is a limit to the magnitude and dangerousness of a blow to which
another is deeemed-to consent.").
'0 Id. at 977.
5' Id. at 978.
52 Id. at 977.
51 Id. at 979.
14 Id. at 978.
15 Id. at 979.
[Vol. 99
THE MANLY SPORTS
the other players got off of the defendant, the defendant got up on one knee
while the victim was lying on the ground and forcibly struck the victim with
his fist. 56 According to the court, the defendant's claim that he was under
attack and struck in self-defense was belied by the time passed and
intervening acts between the two punches. 57  Thus, the Freer decision
suggests that there is a limit to the type of blow to which a party will be
deemed to have consented, even in a violent sports contest in which the
consent to participate is otherwise valid or legal.
Although not decisions fiom United States courts, two Canadian
prosecutions are instructive in trying to define the limits of permissible
assault within a sports contest. In 1969, during a National Hockey League
hockey contest, an altercation on the ice resulted in the prosecution of the
two participants. The fight between Edward "Ted" Green and Wayne Maki
started when Green struck Maki in the face with his gloved hand.58 Maki
retaliated by striking Green in the lower abdomen with his hockey stick.59
The two players then squared off in a stick fight. Green first struck Maki
with his stick near Maki's shoulder.6 ° Maki countered with a stick blow
that left Green seriously injured.6' After the fight, Maki was charged with
assault causing bodily harm.62 Green was charged with simple assault.63
Although both players were eventually acquitted, each of the decisions in
the Ottawa-Carleton Provincial Court discussed the consent defense.64 The
Maki court concluded that the consent defense could not apply to the facts
56 Id.
57 id.
58 R. v. Maki, [1970] 3 O.R. 780 (Can.).
59 R. v. Green, [1971] 1 O.R. 591, 593 (Can.).
60 Maki, 3 O.R. at 781.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 780.
63 Green, 1 O.R. at 591.
64 In the Green decision, the judge commented on Green's consent defense to the simple
assault charge:
There is no doubt that the players who enter the hockey arena consent to a great number of
assaults on their person, because the game of hockey as it is played in the National Hockey
League, which is the league I am dealing with, could not possibly be played at the speed at which
it is played and with the force and vigour with which it is played, and with the competition that
enters into it, unless there were a great number of what would in normal circumstances be called
assaults, but which are not heard of. No hockey player enters on to the ice of the National
Hockey League without consenting to and without knowledge of the possibility that he is going
to be hit in one of many ways once he is on that ice.
Green, 1 O.R. at 594.
The judge in the Maki case saw the consent issue differently: "[Tihere is a question of
degree involved, and no athlete should be presumed to accept malicious, unprovoked or
overly violent attack." Maki, 1 O.R. at 782.
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of this case, reasoning that "no athlete should be presumed to accept
malicious, unprovoked or overly violent attack., 65 The court's theory of the
consent defense was that in sporting contests, participants consent to certain
acts of violence given the very nature of the sport. 66  In Green's
prosecution, the court determined that the victim (Maki) had in fact
consented to being struck in the face by a gloved hand, because this activity
constituted a common practice in hockey games and was unlikely to cause
serious injury.67
The distinction between permissible and impermissible consent is
difficult both to articulate and to discern in practice.68 An Iowa case from
199069 considered the state's assault statute that specifically excepted from
its ambit the acts of any person who was a voluntary participant in a sport,
social, or other activity, not in itself criminal, where the assaultive act was
"a reasonably foreseeable incident of such sport or activity, and [did] not
create an unreasonable risk of serious injury or breach of peace.",70  The
prosecution in that case arose out of a fight occurring in the midst of a
basketball game. One of the players delivered a particularly hard foul and
subsequent blow to the face of an opposing player. 71 The perpetrator of this
hard foul, ultimately the criminal defendant, was not ejected, although his
teammate was.72 Later, another hard foul from a player on the opposing
team led to a brawl that involved numerous players from both teams.73 The
court had little trouble in concluding that the defendant's conduct in
participating in the brawl did not fall within the statutory exception,
rejecting "defendant's suggestion that he is protected from prosecution for
acts committed by him while he is on a playing surface until the final
buzzer, gun, whistle, goal, or out. 74  Instead, the court held that the
65 Maki, 3 O.R. at 782.
66 id.
67 Green, 1 O.R. at 594.
68 See, e.g., Gregory Schiller, Are Athletes Above the Law? From a Two-Minute Minor
to a Twenty-Year Sentence: Regina v. Marty McSorley, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 241, 253 (2003)
(noting that in Maki and Green, the same court that dismissed charges against one player
also found his opponent's actions to be instinctive and thus not inculpatory; thus, both the
instigator and the retaliator were acquitted, even though the retaliator's blow was life-
threatening).
69 State v. Floyd, 466 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
70 Id. at 921.
71 Id. at 920.
72 Id. at 920-21.
73 id.
74 Id. at 922.
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statutory exception was aimed to protect a player who "commits acts during
the course of play,, 75 and acts in "furtherance of the object of the sport.",
76
Even assuming that the defendant and the other fighters were
"participants" in a sport when they engaged in fisticuffs, the court held that
the defendant's acts were not a reasonably foreseeable part of the game of
basketball.77 Basketball might include a reasonable amount of pushing,
shoving, and the occasional elbow and slap.78 According to the court,
however, it strained credibility to conclude that the brutal assault at issue in
the case was reasonably foreseeable. 79  Further, even were the assault
reasonably foreseeable, consent was not a valid defense because the
defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of serious injury or breach
of the peace . 0 The average, reasonable basketball player is unprotected and
unprepared for fist fights.8 1 The court reasoned that the halt in play prior to
the fistfight lent further weight to the conclusion that the fight was not an
incident of basketball. 82
Other decisions have similarly attempted to define the outer contours
of consensual sports. In Commonwealth v. Sostilio,83 a driver in an
automobile race passed an opponent by traveling along the apron, or the
inside of the racing track.8 4 The defendant's conduct caused an accident in
which the opponent was killed. Although consent was not raised as a
defense, the opinion did discuss the issue of whether or not a sport's
participant could be guilty of a crime, here manslaughter, by simply
engaging in conduct inherent to the sport 5 The court stated that physical
contact between race cars is not an essential part of racing automobiles.86
75 Id.
76 id.





82 Id. Many commentators have urged criminal prosecutors to use criminal sanctions to
regulate on-court sports' violence. See Daniel R. Karon, Winning Isn't Everything, It's the
Only Thing. Violence in Professional Sports: The Need for Federal Regulation and
Criminal Sanctions, 25 IND. L. REV. 147 (1991); Mary Carroll, Comment, It's Not How You
Play the Game, It's Whether You Win or Lose: The Need for Criminal Sanctions to Curb
Violence in Professional Sports, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 71 (1988); Comment, Consent in
Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 75 MICH. L. REv. 148 (1976); Bradley C. Nielsen, Note,
Controlling Sports Violence: Too Late for the Carrots-Bring on the Big Stick, 74 IOWA L.
REv. 681 (1989).
83 89 N.E.2d 510 (Mass. 1949).
84 Id. at 511.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 512.
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Thus, the defendant's attempt to drive past those ahead of him where there
was not room to do so rendered a collision almost inevitable, supporting the
conviction for manslaughter.87
III. RULES AS RESTRAINTS ON VIOLENCE
Participants in an athletic contest are deemed to have consented to
assaults and batteries when both the injury and the conduct that caused it
are "reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in an athletic
contest. ' 88 Thus, the fact that certain conduct may constitute a "foul" or
"penalty" under the particular rules of the sport does not necessarily render
the conduct beyond justification under the consent defense. In State v.
Shelley, the defendant was playing a basketball game when he was the
victim of a hard foul that resulted in a scratch to his face. 89 The defendant
subsequently returned to the game and hit the victim (the perpetrator of the
initial hard foul) in the face, breaking the victim's jaw in three places. 90
The defendant argued that the blow to the face was not intentional, but
rather happened in the course of play as a reactive, unthinking response.91
The defendant argued that, because of the previous hard foul by the victim,
the defendant expected another, and thus reacted to a perceived imminent
hard foul. 92 The defendant also raised the defense of consent, arguing that
the victim was injured in the course of normal, if violent, basketball play.93
The trial court stated that as a matter of law, the defense of consent
was not available because the defendant's conduct in striking another player
with a blow to the face exceeded what is considered to be permissible
within the rules of the sport of basketball: "[C]onsent is to contact that is
contemplated within the rules of the game and that is incidental to the
furtherance of the goals of that particular game. 94  The appellate court
disagreed.95 It reasoned that the consent defense is necessary to an assault
action arising out of a sports contest.96  If a consent defense was not
available to a sports-related assault, then most athletic contests would need
87 Id.






94 Id. at 491.
95 The appellate court corrected the reasoning of the trial court and stated that consent is
a defense to an assault that occurs during an athletic event when both the conduct and the




to be banned because many sports involve invasions of physical integrity.
The court reasoned that "society has chosen to foster sports competitions, 9 7
and therefore players must, by necessity, be able to consent to physical
contact with each other when playing the game.9 8
The appellate court rejected a reliance on the rules of the game by
themselves to limit the athlete's scope of consent.99 Citing the Model Penal
Code (MPC), 100 the court determined that a reliance on the rules of the
game to form the limit of consent would be too constricting to athletic play,
as "[c]ertain excesses and inconveniences are to be expected beyond the
formal rules of the game. It may be ordinary and expected conduct for
minor assaults to occur."' 0 1 Instead, the court held that the limits of consent
are formed by the reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a
lawful athletic contest or other competitive sport not forbidden by law.'0 2
Despite these conclusions of law, in the final analysis, the appellate
court held that the magnitude and dangerousness of the defendant's conduct
were beyond the limits of permissible consent. The appellate court found
that there was no question that the defendant intended to hit the victim and
explained that "[t]here is nothing in the game of basketball, or even rugby
or hockey, that would permit consent as a defense" to the defendant's
lashing out at the victim with sufficient force to land a substantial blow to
the jaw.10 3
The court's reasoning raises two substantial issues. First, if a court,
following the MPC, 10 4 holds that the limits of consent are not formed by the
rules of the respective sport or game, but rather by the "reasonably
foreseeable hazards" of joint athletic participation, 105 then the ruling bodies
of sports would theoretically be unable to utilize their control over the rules
97 Id. at 492.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 As the court noted, the commentaries to the Model Penal Code provide:
There are, however, situations in which consent to bodily injury should be recognized as a
defense to crime .... There is ... the obvious case of participation in an athletic contest or
competitive sport where the nature of the enterprise often involves risk of serious injury. Here,
the social judgment that permits the contest to flourish necessarily involves the companion
judgment that reasonably foreseeable hazards can be consented to by virtue of participation.
Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.11 cmt. 2 at 396 (Official Draft
and Revised Comments 1985).
to1 Id. (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 154 (3d ed.
1982)).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 493.
104 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
105 Id. § 2.11(2)(b).
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of a sport to modify the conduct of players. For example, assume the
National Hockey League (NHL) wished to make illegal stick checks no
longer "part of the game." To further this desire, assume the NHL passed a
stringent rule against all illegal contact with hockey sticks and added severe
penalties for infractions. At this point, illegal stick checks would clearly be
prohibited by the rules of the game. Yet under the MPC approach, criminal
prosecutions for assault of players who committed an illegal stick check and
severely injured an opponent would be subject to an absolute defense of
consent; despite their strict prohibition under hockey's rules, stick checks
are now and would remain a reasonably foreseeable hazard of joint
participation in a NHL hockey game. If the rule makers and governing
authorities of a sport are unable to alter the nature of their game, at least as
far as criminal liability is concerned, then it is unclear how exactly a sport
could go about altering the nature of its contest. This result is problematic,
for sports are simply games, lacking any inherent qualities or necessary
attributes. 10 6 Thus, if an organizer of a game wants to create a contest
involving ice skating, sticks, and pucks, but without stick checks or body
checks, and call the sport X, no tribunal or legislature should have cause to
gainsay that creation. But a legal standard, such as that reflected in the
Shelley decision,'0 7 that divorces the scope of participant consent from the
rules of the contest, fails to recognize and respond to the only written
representation as to what risks the participant, had he or she read the rules,
actually agreed to undertake.
The second problem with the court's reasoning in Shelley, which
declines to use the rules of a sport to define the scope of conduct to which a
player consents,108 is that the "reasonably foreseeable hazard" standard
creates a difficult matter of factual interpretation, both for the player in
playing the game and for the tribunal in assessing the player's conduct after
the fact. For instance, the defendant in Shelley argued that his blow to the
victim's face was unplanned and an immediate reaction to what he
perceived to be a threatened hard foul. 10 9 Moreover, the defendant's blow
came during the play of the sport and from the "weak side," or the side
away from the ball, and happened while the two players were looking at the
106 The U.S. Supreme Court suggested the opposite in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661 (2001). The Court in this decision implied that the sport of golf has an existence
and nature apart from its rules. In Martin, a golfer who was unable to walk the golf course
due to a disability sued to be permitted to use a golf cart. The rules of the PGA expressly
required all competitors to walk the course. In holding for Martin, the Court ruled that the
game of golf involves only striking a ball into a hole, and that walking was not part of the
game, despite the PGA rule stating that it is. Id. at 683-85.
107 Shelley, 929 P.2d at 492.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 490.
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ball. 1 0° It is not at all obvious to the player that such a blow to the face of
an opponent would subject him to criminal liability."' Ignoring this
possibility, the appellate court declared that "there is no question" but that
the defendant intended to hit the victim, i2 a strong conclusion that not only
seems unsupportable in light of the court's recitation of the facts of the
case,11 3 but also raises an issue under the rule of lenity traditionally applied
in criminal cases.1 4 The court's mention of the sport of hockey, albeit in
dicta, suggests the ambiguity of the court's standard. In hockey, blows to
the head and other parts of the opponent's body with a gloved hand are not
uncommon, yet can result in severe injuries,"' thus suggesting the need for
flexibility in the application of criminal law.
Another modem American prosecution of a professional sports athlete
for violence on the field of play against a fellow competitor involved a
hockey player, Dave Forbes of the Boston Bruins. 116 During a 1975 NHL
game, Forbes used a hockey stick to commit what was alleged to be
aggravated assault. 17  The prosecution was granted an instruction that,
regarding the crime of aggravated assault, a person cannot consent either
expressly or by implication to be a victim of a crime.' 18 Upon deliberation,
"10 Id. at 493.
111 The defendant also claimed that the statute in question was vague as applied to sports'
altercations because it failed to provide either adequate notice of proscribed conduct or
standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement as to athletes who believe they can be rough
because they are accustomed to unprosecuted rough play. Id. In response, the appellate
court stated that "an ordinary person should understand that intentionally punching a person
in an athletic competition may result in prosecution." Id. at 494. Once again, the evidence
from the trial court did not make clear that the defendant had punched the complainant with
a closed fist, nor that he necessarily did so with intention.
..2 Id. at 493.
113 The only pertinent fact available in the trial record cited by the appellate court was the
defendant's insistence that the blow was not intentional.
114 See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955). See generally Paul H. Robinson,
Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
393, 393-94 (1988) (arguing the need for flexibility during liability assessment similar to the
discretion exercised during sentencing).
115 See People v. Schacker, 670 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (Dist. Ct. 1998) ("If cross checking,
tripping and punching were criminal acts, the game of hockey could not continue in its
present form.").






the jury divided and a mistrial was declared.11 9 Seldom has on-ice hockey
violence resulted in a criminal conviction.120
IV. PERMISSIVE VIOLENCE
A New York court followed a different approach to the problem of
defining the limits of consent to assaultive behavior in a sports contest in
People v. Schacker.121 After the whistle was blown during a hockey game,
the defendant skated up behind the complainant, who was standing near the
goal. 122 According to the testimony at trial, the defendant came up behind
the complainant and struck the complainant with his hand on the back of the
neck, causing the complainant to strike his head on the crossbar of the
goal. 123 The complainant sustained a concussion, and suffered headaches
and other minor injuries as a result. 124 In response to the argument that the
plaintiff "assumed the risk" of injury, 125 the court reasoned that a player in a
sport accepts the dangers that inhere in the sport insofar as they are obvious
and necessary.1 26 The sport of hockey, according to the court, includes
intentional conduct that has the appearance of criminal acts:
[I]n order to allege a criminal act which occurred in a hockey game, the factual
portion of the information must allege acts that show that the intent was to inflict
physical injury which was unrelated to the athletic competition. Although play may
have terminated, the information herein does not show that the physical contact had
no connection with the competition.127
This standard, requiring that the alleged criminal activity be
"unrelated" to the sport in order to warrant prosecution, seems to present
wider latitude for violent conduct than does the standard articulated in the
MPC.128 In Schacker, the whistle had blown and play had stopped.'2 9 No
119 Id.
120 Dino Ciccarelli was the first NHL player to be imprisoned for an on-ice incident. He
was convicted in a Toronto court and spent a single day in jail. Austin Murphy, "North Star
On Ice," SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1988, at 34. For another example, see R. v.
McSorley, [2000] B.C.P.C. 0116 (British Colom.), available at
http://www.provincialcourt.bc.ca/judgments/pc/2000/01/pOOOll6.htm (finding defendant
guilty of assault for apparently vicious slash to head of opponent).
121 People v. Schacker, 670 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Dist. Ct. 1998).




126 Id. (quoting Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y.
1929)).
127 Id. at 309-10.
128 See State v. Shelley, 929 P.2d 489, 490 (Wash. 1997).
129 Schacker, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
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evidence was presented that the defendant and the complainant had engaged
in some prior interaction during the hockey contest that led to the assault.
The only evidence that linked the assault to the hockey game was that the
players were still on the ice and the hockey game, although the whistle had
temporarily stopped play, was an ongoing event. 130  Despite this slim
connection with the sport, the defendant's assault was excused as assumed
risk. 31 The court did not explain why this particular assault was more "in
connection" or "related" to the sport of hockey than any other crime
perpetrated on the ice in the midst of a sporting contest would be.
Instead of relying on a factual distinction to justify its conclusion, the
Schacker court instead referred to two considerations it found paramount.
32
First, the nature of the injury suffered by the complainant was relatively
minor. Criminal liability, according to the opinion, requires that "the
injuries must be so severe as to be unacceptable in normal competition,
requiring a change in the nature of the game. That type of injury is not
present in this case. ,1 33 The second justification was grounded in policy:
"The idea that a hockey player should be prosecuted runs afoul of the policy
to encourage free and fierce competition in athletic events.' 34
The court's concern about encouraging "fierce competition" may have
been at odds with the intent of the contest's organizers and participants. In
fact, the game in which the complainant was injured took place in a non-
checking hockey league. 135 Nonetheless, reasoned the court, the doctrine of
consent should not be limited by the rules of the particular game:
While the rules of the league may prohibit certain conduct, thereby reducing the
potential injuries, nevertheless, the participant continues to assume the risk of a
strenuous and competitive athletic endeavor. The normal conduct in a hockey game
cannot be the standard for criminal activity under the Penal Law, nor can the Penal
Law be imposed on a hockey game without running afoul of the policy of encouragingS136
athletic competition.
Although Schacker's "in-connection" standard permits even greater
scope for the consent defense than does the "reasonably foreseeable hazard"
standard adopted in Shelley,137 the decision of the court in Schacker is
subject to the same critique as that in Shelley. The fact that the league was
a non-checking league should have mattered in the decision. Presumably,







137 State v. Shelley, 929 P.2d 489, 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
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the founders of that league, by their decision to eliminate checking from the
game, sought to alter the "reasonable hazards" to which hockey players
might ordinarily be presumed to consent. The fact that the court found that
the participants impliedly consented to the "normal" level of violence
attendant to a checking hockey game,13 and not a non-checking game,
suggests that the leagues are comparatively powerless to change the nature
of their contests, at least for the purposes of criminal prosecutions. This is
an important criticism. The ability of leagues to alter the expectations and
implied consent of players to make certain contests more safe than
"normal" is vital to offer a range of sporting activities, and attendant
sporting risks, and to provide a product that might attract participants who
prefer a slightly different game. In other words, certain players might wish
to participate in safer leagues in order to change exactly those "reasonable
hazards" that are commonly known to attend a hockey contest. These
participants may reasonably expect to enjoy the protection of the criminal
law along with other liability standards to ensure that the game in which
they are participating delivers on its implied promise of heightened safety.
In addition, the court's decision to divorce its estimation of consent
from the actual rules of the game is further problematic, given the court's
adoption of a seemingly broad and theoretically limitless standard of "in
connection" to the game.139 In theory, the court's standard would justify
nearly any simple assault as long as it took place on the ice in the midst of
an athletic contest. The fact that the complainant did not suffer severe
trauma1 40 should not be dispositive in assessing the legality of the
defendant's behavior. Nevertheless, the court's policy concern is genuine,
as severe criminal sanctions for on-court conduct that is or may be a
somewhat ordinary part of a contest would tend to deter the willingness of
athletes to play physical sports with verve and aggressiveness.
1 41
V. SUSTAINING THE MANLY SPORTS
The most obvious issue in specifying the limits of consent to sports
violence is the desire that games be played aggressively and with maximum
effort. 42  Should ordinary aggressive sports play be transmogrified into
criminal assault, then participants would, at the margin, decline to play
138 Schacker, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
139 Id.
140 id.
141 See Limon v. Texas, No. 04-00-00276-CR, 2001 WL 356247 (Tex. App. Apr. 11,
2001). Limon accepted a plea bargain on a charge of aggravated assault with serious bodily
injury. Limon was sentenced to five years in prison for elbowing an opponent in the face
during a basketball game. Id.
142 See Schacker, 670 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
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sports in a manner that might give rise to liability. Indeed, the stigma of a
criminal conviction and the severity of a criminal sanction, including its
profound collateral consequences in terms of social and employment
relations, might even lead athletes to refuse to engage in conduct that,
although lawful, could approach the line of illegality, for fear of
misinterpretation. 
143
A thoughtful discussion of the doctrine of consent with regard to
violence in sports contests appears in the decision of State v. Gudugli.
144
This discussion arose in the context of an appellate opinion on the alleged
deficiency of trial counsel for his failure to raise the issue of implied
consent as a defense. 145 The defendant had been convicted of misdemeanor
assault for punching an opponent in the eye. 146 The altercation arose in the
midst of a heated argument during an intramural basketball contest. 147 The
opinion cited several reasons why the doctrine of consent should be applied
liberally in the sports context.
First, most sports contests, including the intramural game at issue, are
already subject to some regulation of player behavior, if only through the
calls of the game officials, sanctions of the league, or university
oversight. 148  The fact that such immediate and internal sanctions are
available and are commonly used is a reason for prosecutors and criminal
courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over on-field violence.
149
Second, the opinion notes the learned aggressiveness of athletes-
especially American athletes playing certain competitive, physical sports-
which often includes modest levels of violence, retaliation, and
intimidation. 50 Third, competitive sports are expected to produce a certain
number of non-severe injuries stemming from illegal contact; the fact that
the complainant in this case was mildly injured should counsel restraint in
applying the severe sanctions of the criminal law to this conduct. 151
143 See Yates & Gillespie, supra note 15, at 160-61 (arguing that courts must take into
account implied consent in assessing the legality of sports violence); Charles Harary,
Comment, Aggressive Play or Criminal Assault? An In-Depth Look at Sports Violence and
Criminal Liability, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 197, 204-05 (2002) (discussing the need for
courts to give latitude to consent doctrine for fear of deterring sports behavior).
144 811 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
141 Id. at 576.
146 Id. at 570.
147 Id. at 569.
141 See id. at 575.
149 Id. (citation omitted).
1S0 Id. at 574 (citation omitted).
151 See id. at 575.
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A significant number of academic commentators similarly counsel
restraint in the application of criminal law to sports violence.152 Given the
reluctance of courts, as a general matter, to uphold indictments of athletes
for violent activities on the playing field, several legislative proposals have
been offered to address the situation.153 To date, none have passed into
law.
154
None of the current approaches to the problem of on-court player-to-
player violence is satisfactory.155 On the one hand, adopting the broad in-
connection standard of consent, 116 as did the court in Shelley,'5 7 where
consent includes any act of violence done in relation or in connection to a
game, 158 grants too much permission for undue, intentional violence. The
fact that one has suited up for a sports contest should not enable one to
commit nearly any act that is plausibly connected to the game and defend
one's conduct against criminal prosecution, no matter how grievous the
harm caused, on account of implied consent on the part of the victim. No
person would knowingly offer such consent to criminal conduct where
serious harm is the intended result.
On the other hand, a jurisprudential approach that does not recognize
the defense of implied consent and give that doctrine adequate scope would
unnecessarily subject athletes to criminal liability for what often can be
immediate, reflexive, unthinking physical responses to perceived threats or
152 See Antoinette Clarke, Law and Order on the Courts: The Application of Criminal
Liability for Intentional Fouls During Sporting Events, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1149 (2000);
Harary, supra note 143. But see Lassiter, supra note 5.
153 See Sports Violence Act, H.R. 7903, 96th Cong. (1980); Federal Sports Act, S. 3445,
92nd Cong. (1972).
154 The Sports Violence Act would create a new federal criminal offense of "[e]xcessive
violence during professional sporting events." H.R. 7903 § 115. It would proscribe a
player's using "excessive physical force" causing a "risk of significant bodily injury to
another person." Id. § 115(a). The bill defined excessive force as physical force which "(A)
has no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of the sport; (B) is unreasonably
violent; and (C) could not be reasonably foreseen, or was not consented to, by the injured
person, as a normal hazard." Id. § 115(b)(1).
155 Along with the proposed statutes, supra note 153, other proposals to define the role of
criminal law have been offered. See Ronald A. DiNicola & Scott Mendeloff, Controlling
Violence in Professional Sports: Rule Reform and the Federal Professional Sports Violence
Commission, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 843 (1983); Chris J. Carlsen & Matthew Shane Walker, Note,
The Sports Court: A Private System to Deter Violence in Professional Sports, 55 S. CAL. L.
REv. 399 (1982); Clete Samson, Comment, No Time Like the Present: Why Recent Events
Should Spur Congress to Enact a Sports Violence Act, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949 (2005).





slights, or other aggressive conduct.1 59 Vigorous intervention of criminal
prosecution in the world of professional and amateur sports could
theoretically do too much to dampen American competitive enthusiasm and
learned aggressiveness that is requisite to many sporting endeavors.
160
Many sports are best played with controlled aggression, to the enjoyment of
both the fans and the participants. Thus, neither of the polar opposite
positions appears to present a satisfactory resolution of the problem.
The intermediate approach of the MPC seems similarly flawed as
applied to sports contests.161 The more fluid MPC standard appears to solve
none of the problems of violence in sports and, indeed, appears to create
some problems of its own. The MPC would allow participants to defend
their conduct to the extent that their behavior constituted a reasonably
foreseeable hazard of the joint athletic competition.162 This test, borrowed
from tort law, 163 renders the rules of the sport of secondary significance in
assessing the limitations of a player's consent. 164 Yet the actual rules of the
game comprise the only written "contract" to which the participants might
have agreed. Instructing the finder-of-fact to look for conduct that is a
"reasonably foreseeable hazard[] of joint participation in a lawful athletic
contest or competitive sport"' 165 provides little guidance to the finder-of-fact
or, more importantly, to the athletic participant. In fact, the decisions
applying this standard are irreconcilable and hinge on matters of degree.
66
159 See, e.g., id. at 490 (referring to defendant's argument that his conduct, in the wake of
a previous hard foul by the victim, was a reaction to a perceived imminent hard foul).
160 See Clarke, supra note 152, at 1158 (noting that aggressiveness and competitive spirit
inherent in sports are learned and taught).
161 The MPC provides:
Consent to Bodily Injury. When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes
or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense
if:
(a) the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or
(b) the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a
lawful athletic contest or competitive sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law; or
(c) the consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 3 of the Code.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
162 See id.
163 See, e.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929)
("One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are
obvious and necessary .... ).
164 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
165 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2).
166 See, e.g., Iowa v. Floyd, 466 N.W.2d 919, 923 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (finding on-court
brawl during stoppage of play is not a reasonably foreseeable incident of basketball and,
even if it were, any consent would be invalid given the unreasonable risk of serious injury or
breach of the peace); People v. Freer, 381 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Dist. Ct. 1976) (finding that
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More importantly, by ignoring the sport's definition of consent, the MPC
approach precludes sports leagues or other contest organizers from
explicitly amending the "reasonably foreseeable hazards" through the rules
and sanctions of the sport.' 67 By instructing the finder-of-fact to look for
reasonable hazards without regard to the actual rules of the game, the MPC
approach contemplates a game apart from the rules that create that game. 168
Thus, the MPC approach portends a platonic ideal of a sport that exists only
in the world of jurisprudence.
Similarly, if the limits of consent and, thereby, criminal liability were
defined by literal application of the rules of the game, the result would also
be flawed. Under a rules-of-the-game approach, every transgression of a
rule could potentially subject the perpetrator to a criminal prosecution, and
the deterrent effect of a penalty or foul would be grossly amplified. For
example, a baseball pitcher who pitches inside, misses the target, strikes the
batter, and whose conduct is ruled an intentional "beanball" could be liable
for criminal assault.169  Similarly, a basketball player instructed by his
coach to commit an intentional foul in order to stop the clock in a late-game
situation might refuse to do so for fear that his conduct, although in pursuit
of and well within the boundaries of the sporting contest, would constitute
an intentional transgression of the rules and therefore fall outside of the
defense of consent.
VI. USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE SPORTS
The solution to the vexing problem of the use of criminal regulation in
sports contests lies within a jurisprudential approach not yet taken in any of
the decided cases, either within the United States or within Canada or
Germany-other countries with substantial jurisprudence on this issue.
170
This solution would look to the only clear line of demarcation that presents
complainant did not consent to defendant's punch when the punch took place after a tackle
and pile-up); State v. Shelley, 929 P.2d 489, 490 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
"consent ... is not limited to conduct within the rules of games," but extends to "conduct
and harm that are the reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in an athletic
contest").
167 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168 See MODEL PENAL CODE §2.1 1(2)(b).
169 See, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393 (Cal. 2006) (finding
that being hit by a pitch intentionally thrown at the batter's head is a fundamental and
inherent risk of baseball).
170 See Yates & Gillespie, supra note 15, at 168 ("Criminal prosecutions can be an
effective means by which to send the message that society will not tolerate acts of
unnecessary violence by sports participants."); Diane V. White, Note, Sports Violence as
Criminal Assault: Development of the Doctrine by Canadian Courts, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1030,
1034-38, 1048-54. But see Clarke, supra note 152, at 1192 ("Applying criminal liability to
intentional fouls during sporting events is ill-advised.").
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a plausible approach to regulating both the sport and the potential criminal
conduct of sports participants. This approach limits implied consent to the
violent acts permitted by the rules of the contest, but also includes conduct
explicitly not permitted, but instead otherwise anticipated, by those rules.
Rather, the doctrine of consent would apply to all conduct "covered" by or
contemplated by those rules. For example, fighting in hockey is
specifically prohibited by the National Hockey League (NHL) official rules
of hockey. 171 Nonetheless, fighting appears to be an important part of the
game.172 Fighting is so ingrained in the game that the NHL has a specific
rule addressing fighting and a specific penalty established for it.173 Thus,
the NHL rules anticipate and account for hockey fights, even as they
prohibit that conduct. On the other hand, if a hockey player purposefully
uses his stick to maim another player, in such a way that his use of the stick
did not constitute one of the stipulated stick-related penalties such as cross-
checking or slashing, then that player would be appropriately subject to
criminal prosecution. 174 This approach would require a finder-of-fact to
distinguish from a normal cross-check or slash, and one done with the intent
to injure.
Similarly, the official rules of Major League Baseball (MLB)
specifically prohibit the act of throwing a beanball and provide penalties for
possible ejection for players who violate this rule.1 75 Nevertheless, courts
have held that the beanball is a "part of the game" of baseball. 176 Under the
proposed approach, an intentional beanball would not ordinarily subject the
pitcher to criminal liability because, if the player is prosecuted, consent
would provide a complete defense. However, if a batter were to take a
baseball bat and attack another player,177 an act not covered by or
contemplated by the rules of baseball, then the batter would appropriately
be subject to criminal prosecution without access to the consent defense.
171 NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, OFFICIAL RULES 2008-2009 § 6, R. 47 (2008), available at
http://www.nhl.com/rules/index.html.
172 See White, supra note 170, at 1039 ("1 have no doubt whatsoever that fighting is part
of the game of hockey." (quoting R. v. Henderson, [1976] 5 W.W.R. 119, 123 (Can.))).
173 See NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, supra note 171.
174 For a further comment on the Maki and Green cases, see Barbara Svoranos,
Comment, Fighting? It's All in a Day's Work on the Ice: Determining the Appropriate
Standard of a Hockey Player's Liability to Another Player, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 487,
504-05 (1997).
175 PLAYING RULES COMM., MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL RULES R.
8.02(d) (2008), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/officialinfo/officialrules/
foreword.j sp.
176 See Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393 (Cal. 2006).
177 Former major league player, Jose Offerman, is currently under indictment for such an
attack in a minor league game. See Offerman Pleads Not Guilty in Bat Attack, NBC SPORTS,
Sept. 24, 2007, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/20272598/site/21683474/.
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JEFFREY STANDEN
The proposed approach restores the control and definition of consent
to the game's players, participants, and officials. For example, the NHL
could decide to make hockey a non-physical sport for marketing or
participation purposes. In that scenario, the NHL could rely on the
possibility of criminal prosecution to police game players. If the rules of a
non-contact hockey contest were written to preclude all body checks and
the like, then a player who accidentally or intentionally commits a body
check on another player would be subject to a game penalty, but would not,
under the proposed approach, be without the defense of consent in a
criminal prosecution. On the other hand, a player who transgresses that
limited qualified consent by engaging in conduct that goes well beyond the
body check (for example, fisticuffs or post-whistle violence) would fall
outside of the conduct anticipated by the rules. That player would be
without the defense of consent to any criminal prosecution.
The threat of a criminal prosecution has a place in regulating
contemporary sports contests. However, criminal prosecution should be
limited to situations where players violate not only the range of permissible
conduct, as provided by the relevant rules of the sport, but also the range of
conduct specifically prohibited by those same rules. Only conduct that is
far outside the rule makers' and the game participants' contemplation
should subject athletes to criminal prosecution without access to the defense
of consent.
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